Thursday, September 24, 2009
Highlights 1, 2 & 3, I'll just leave it at that. If you want more details, I urge you to attend the next community meeting.
The Emerging Technologies session had several points of interest but it left me wanting more. In a nutshell, PCI SSC contracted PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to evaluate and create a report on emerging technologies and how they impact PCI. The summary given at this meeting was a 100,000 foot view of various emerging technologies – yes, 100,000 foot view, not the more common 50,000 foot view. While they made it a point that the report in no way endorsed any one technology and the report was not intended to rate the technologies, they did detail the four most popular technologies: End-to-End Encryption, Tokenization, Virtual Terminal, and Magnetic Swipe Authentication.
Magnetic Swipe Authentication technologies address card present fraud, but do not really address any PCI security or scoping issues so I'll skip that one. The other three; yeah and it's about time! While I don't agree with some details of the how they rated cost vs. reward vs. impact in different categories, I gave PwC a little leeway because they were bundling multiple vendor solutions into fairly broad categories.
The only category rating that really stuck out like a sore thumb was the business impact of end-to-end encryption vs. tokenization – they gave end-to-end a less business impact rating (more favorable) than tokenization. Shift4 provides solutions that straddle all three technologies (end-to-end, tokenization, and virtual terminal) and from experience, tokenization has far less impact to the business flow than end-to-end. Reason being, the merchant systems never have access to the card number. While security wise, this is a plus for end-to-end, business impact wise there are a lot of gotchas. One example is that many risk and customer loyalty systems use the card number (or more preferably, a hash of the card number) as a key to look up the customer. Stronger forms of encryption produce non-repeatable results when the same information is encrypted so this simple process of a customer lookup becomes problematic.
All in all, just the fact that the PCI SSC is seriously looking at these emerging technologies is promising whereas heretofore, they have always brushed this off as a risk/compliance judgment call for the acquiring banks. I can't wait to see what PCI SSC does with this information and I hope they publish the PwC report.
I will mention one note that I feel was a lowlight: Some of the questions in the Q & A sessions, I'm pretty sure, were asked in similar events three and four years ago. The root cause of the biggest areas of confusion stems from the gap between security and compliance. Bob Russo is the first to state the PCI SSC has nothing to do with "compliance" – instead, PCI is the keeper of the security standards. Yet the card brands dictate that PCI compliance is mandatory.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
The payments industry never ceases to amaze me. My latest amazement is how our prodigies are chosen when it comes to security. Here are three examples and if anyone has any explanation why, please feel free to post your thoughts:
(I'll keep the company and personal names out of this; if you're familiar with the industry, you know who I'm talking about)
First on my hit list, a prominent payment processor promoting a new security technology was a victim of one of the largest data breaches exposing credit card information. This by itself is not an issue because a breach can happen to anyone. What baffles me is that proper deployment and use of existing encryption technology could have prevented their breach. This seems like a deflection tactic: instead of shoring up our security gaps, we'll head up the development of a new theoretical technology where no one needs to be secure. This is the example of a perfectly executed public relations campaign.
Next on my list, the Visa poster child for how a POS company should tackle security is probably the biggest factor in requiring CISP and later PCI. Security was all but completely ignored in all pre-2003 versions of their software; card holder data was stored in plain text in various files, remote access with administration level privileges all shared the same login credentials across the entire merchant base, system level administration access was required for all stations and the installation of anti-virus software was frowned upon (all practices that directly oppose security best practices). Then overnight – presto-chango – the model POS vendor for security (even though their application was not truly PCI compliant out-of-the-box until 2008).
Last on my list is a large merchant and victim of a breach that is now doing the "learn from our mistakes" tour. Don't get me wrong; someone who's been on the breach hot seat is the best speaker for convincing merchants to be secure. But let's get all the facts out. Less than two years earlier the decision makers at the company nixed a proposal that could have prevented their breach. Nixing a proposal is not the issue here, it's the reason given: "we don't need that technology, our systems are already secure." I've not heard this little fact on the "woe is me" tour, instead "we were just an innocent victim."
I promise, I'll be in a better mood next time. ;-)